Återgå till huvudnavigering Återgå till sök Gå direkt till huvudinnehållet

Moral hazard, vertical integration, and public monitoring in credence goods

Publikation: Bidrag till tidskriftArtikel i vetenskaplig tidskriftPeer review

Sammanfattning

Moral hazard is a problem in markets where the qualities or characteristics of products cannot be verified with certainty by consumers. Here we demonstrate that vertical integration is one possible way of dealing with such problems. When the saving of monitoring costs is the driving force behind vertical integration, public monitoring freely available to the market may prevent vertical integration.
OriginalspråkEngelska
Sidor (från-till)271-279
Antal sidor9
TidskriftEuropean Review of Agricultural Economics
Volym29
Nummer2
DOI
StatusPublicerad - 2002

Nyckelord

  • credence goods
  • moral hazard
  • vertical integration

Citera det här